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THE NEGLIGENT M-URDER-IS IT OBJECTIVE OR SUBJEC-
TIVE? (Subjective View)*
Justice Holmes took the position that a dangerous act causing
the death of a human being constituted murder if the actor had
knowledge of circumstances that would have led "a man of common
understanding" to foresee death or serious bodily harm from the act.'
Thus, the test of the negligent murder, according to Holmes, is ob-
jective: Would a reasonable man, knowing these circumstances, have
foreseen danger to human life? If so, the actor is guilty of murder
whether he was actually aware of the danger or not.
Stephen took a different view, maintaining that in order for
death from a dangerous act to constitute murder, the actor must
have had knowledge of the danger accompanying that act.' This is
a subjective requirement and probably represents the weight of
authority in the United States.'
At first blush these two views seem to be very similar. Where
the actor had knowledge of the circumstances he will usually have
had knowledge of the danger-at least a jury may safely infer so in
most cases. However, it is theoretically possible to have knowledge
of the circumstances and yet not have knowledge of the danger.'
For example, a person who is very drunk, or whose mind is befogged
with fatigue and drowsiness, might be aware that he is driving his
car, that the streets are crowded, and yet not be able to draw the
conclusion that these facts, plus a fast rate of speed, constitute great
danger.
If this is true, a practical difference is seen between the view of
Stephen and that of Holmes, at least in some cases. Suppose, in the
hypothetical situation above, that a pedestrian were killed. The
driver could not be guilty of murder under Stephen's view since he
did not have knowledge of the danger. Having had knowledge of
* A Companion Note taking the objective view is printed pp.
242-251.
'HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) 55-56.
"Malice aforethought means any one or more of the following
states of mind . . . (b) knowledge that the act which causes death
will probably cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, some
person, whether such person is the person actually killed or not;
although such knowledge is accompanied by indifference whether
death or grievous bodily harm is caused or not, or by a wish that
it may not be caused." STEPHEN, DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1887) 161-162.
'MORELAND, A RATIONALE OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE (1944) 59;
see State v. Massey, 20 Ala. App. 56, 100 So. 625, 627 (1924); State v.
Capps, 134 N. C. 622, 46 S. E. 730, 732 (1904); Tarver v. State, 90
Tenn. 485, 16 S.W. 1041, 1044 (1891) ; Aiken v. State, 10 Tex. App.
610, 618 (1881).
4 MORELAND, op. cit. supra, n. 3i n. 191 at 55.
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the circumstances, however, he might be guilty under the objective
view of Holmes.
The purpose of this note is to determine which of these tests is
the more desirable as a basis for determining whether, in cases of
death resulting from extremely dangerous conduct, murder has been
committed. This problem is important, for the law would, by adopt-
ing the view of Holmes, make the pattern of negligence uniform by
determining liability, both civil and criminal, objectively. Civil lia-
bility is now arrived at in this manner,8 and according to several
writers the trend in the criminal law is in the direction of such ob-
jectivity.
Whether the view of Holmes or that of Stephen is the more satis-
factory will depend on the answer given to the question: Is mens rea
a requisite of negligent murder? This requires a brief consideration
of the doctrine of mens rea.
An historical basis of that doctrine is the Christian concept of
freedom of the will.1 If an individual, having freedom of will, com-
mitted a harmful act accompanied by a mental element such as in-
tent, he was deemed deserving of punishment, for a guilty mind was
indicated. So, clearly a mental element was required to prove a
wrongful exercise of the will and therefore a guilty mind. While the
historical purpose (punishment) of establishing mens rea may no
longer have efficacy, and though mens rea may differ today from
its historical meaning," the concept of freedom of the will still re-
mains. Indeed, our democratic institutions, dependent on respon-
sibility of the individual, necessarily presuppose that the individual
has freedom of the will. Therefore, this writer believes that this con-
cept underlies the fixing of criminal responsibility. To deny this is
to say that the individual may be criminally responsible for an act
which is the product of factors over which he had no control and,
therefore, could not have prevented. Thus wrongful exercise of the
will is a prerequisite of criminality.
This prerequisite obviously cannot occur in negligent murder
unless the individual is confronted with a choice to act dangerously
or to act safely." If then he commits an extremely dangerous act
and death (though not intended) results from it, the actor is guilty
of negligent murder, for by an exercise of his will he chose to do
the act which caused the death.
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) Sec. 282.
'CLARK AND MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES (4th ed. 1940) Sec. 42;
Levitt, Extent and Function of the Doctrine of Mens Rea (1923) 17
ILL. L. REV. 578; Sayre, Mens Rea (1932) 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1019;
Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses (1933) 33 CALIF. L. REV. 55, 58.
Levitt, op. cit. supra, n. 6.
'Sayre, Mens Rea (1932) 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1019.
"This approach would lead to the conclusion that in negligent
manslaughter mens rea is also required. See SALMOND, JURISPRU-
DENCE (7th ed. 1924) Sec. 140; Book Review (1945) 9 CAMB. L. J.' 147;
Note (1898) 12 HARV. L. REV. 428, 429.
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The key word is choice, for without having had it, it could not be
proved that the actor wrongfully exercised his will. But choice is
based on a mental state-knowledge of alternatives. The alterna-
tives are to act dangerously or not to act dangerously. Obviously,
knowledge of the danger is necessary to confront one with a choice
between these alternatives. Otherwise, it could not be said that he
chose to act dangerously. As a test in itself the theory of Holmes
does not satisfy the mental element requisite for choice (knowledge
of the alternatives). However, knowledge of the circumstances may
be used to prove, by inference, that the actor had knowledge of the
danger and therefore knowledge of the alternatives-to act danger-
ously or not to act dangerously. This would be an application of a
subjective test in proving knowledge of the danger by inference.
This is probably precluded in cases such as extreme drunkenness
and absent-mindedness.
From the foregoing it would seem that in negligent murder
knowledge of extreme danger accompanying an act resulting in death
is necessary to prove a requisite mens rea. This mens rea may be
termed wanton indifference to the safety of others.
The law as applied in the cases bears out the logic of the conclu-
sion just reached. The law has evidently recognized that there is a
state of mind close to, and just as reprehensible as, intent to take
life-wanton indifference as to whether the death of another occurs
or not. That is, disregard of a known danger (extreme) which re-
sults in death, is deserving of the label, "murder." As one court
said in convicting of murder: "That man who can coolly shoot into
a moving train, or automobile, or other vehicle in which are persons
guiltless of any wrongdoing toward him or provocation for such at-
tack, is, if possible, worse than the man who endures insult and
broods over a wrong, real or fanciful, and then waylays and kills his
personal enemy." Thus, when malice is presumed" or intent im-
plied," the court is convicting for murder one whose state of mind
proved just as dangerous to human life as that of the intentional
killer. That this state of mind is wantonness is further evidenced by
the language used by the courts in describing the negligent murderer.
Typical descriptions state that the defendant had a "depraved
mind,"13 "malignity of heart,"' a heart "regardless of social duty and
fatally bent on mischief."'5 These are subjective terms, descriptive
of a state of mind (wanton indifference) which led the actor to
ignore extreme danger known to accompany his act.
"1Banks v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. Rep. 165, 211 S.W. 217, 218
(1919).
"Smith v. State, 124 Ga. 213, 52 S. E. 329, 330 (1905).
' Russell v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 590, 44 S. W. 159, 160-61
(1898); see Pool v. State, 87 Ga. 526, 13 S. E. 556, 557 (1891).
"3State v. Massey, 20 Ala. App. 56, 100 So. 625, 627 (1924);
Bailey v. State, 133 Ala. 155, 32 So. 57, 58 (1902).
' Tarver v. State, 90 Tenn. 485, 16 S.W. 1041, 1044 (1891).
"State v. Young, 50 W. Va. 96, 40 S. E. 334 (1901).
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The discussion to this point has warranted the conclusion that
the negligent murder requires a form of mens rea, wanton indiffer-
ence, which can be proved by the theory of Stephen but not by that
of Holmes. It might be well to test this conclusion by determining
whether it is in accord with the purpose of the criminal law.
Whether that purpose be either punishment or prevention and
deterrence, the end to be obtained is that of making men choose to
conform." The theory of Stephen is helpful in this respect. It pro-
vides an index to the mind and character of the accused. If it is
determined that he had knowledge of the danger and yet ignored it,
the causes of his failure to choose to conform are indicated. These
may be deep seated mental attitudes: indifference to the rights of
others, anti-social outlook, desire for dangerous experiences, and so
on.
But, to ignore a criminal's state of mind at the time of the act,
except that he had knowledge of the circumstances, and to proceed
objectively, is to refuse to face these subjective factors that made
the individual a criminal.
It follows that whatever the purpose of the criminal law, in
dealing with the criminal, the theory of Stephen is more helpful than
that of Holmes. For, if the purpose is to punish, the index to his
character and mind reveals the extent of the punishment necessary.
Indeed, knowledge of the danger must be proved to establish blame-
worthiness (calling for punishment). Without such knowledge the
individual may have exercised his best judgment and thought his
conduct safe. The objective theory would not prove that an indi-
vidual had knowledge of the danger but that as a reasonable man he
is deemed to have had. This is based on the obvious fallacy that men
are all alike. At least in such situations as absent-mindedness,
knowledge of the danger, and therefore blameworthiness at the
time of the act, are precluded. Thus, punishment under an objective
test would prove unwise. As one prominent writer states: "To sub-
ject defendants entirely free from moral blameworthiness to the
possibility of prison sentences is revolting to the community sense
of justice; and no law which violates this fundamental instinct can
long endure."'7
If the purpose of the criminal law is to prevent and deter danger-
ous acts, from this index, as a guide, may be fashioned measures
with the view of preventing and detering the dangerous states of
mind responsible for such acts. The preventive theory is based on
the probability that similar injuries will be instigated in the future
by the same offender.' But this probability cannot be determined
without looking to the mind of the actor at the time he did the act.
If he had knowledge of the danger, he might be likely to repeat the
offense, but if he did not, the offense may have been one not likely
"Sayre, op. cit. supra, n. 8, n. 4 at 975-76.
'7 Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses (1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 55, 72.
' SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW (1927) 12.
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to occur again. A murder conviction would therefore not only be
unjust; it would serve no useful purpose.
In another respect the objective test fails to aid in preventing
dangerous acts. It is little concerned with mental states but em-
phasizes the external manifestations of them. This being true, an
individual may not strive to obtain the desired level of mental and
moral excellence which prevents dangerous conduct; but may actual-
ly be discouraged therefrom.' The reason is obvious. An individ-
ual may strive to be a good citizen, and as nearly perfect mentally
and morally as possible. Yet, under an objective test he might be
found guilty of negligent murder for engaging in conduct the danger
of which he was not aware. How this would make an individual
choose to conform to a desired standard of conduct is difficult to
understand. For these reasons, the theory of Stephen, requiring
knowledge of the danger to convict of negligent murder, is more in
accord with the possible purposes of the criminal law than is the
objective theory of Holmes.
ARNETT MANN
"'Note (1939) 27 KY. L. J. 229, 231.
